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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. W^hcther Connecticut’s sex offender registry statute avoids due process concerns by not
imposing a stigma or a material burden or loss on the sex offenders when it provides the
public with purely factual information.
II. Whether Alaska’s sex offender registry statute complies with the Ex Post Facto Clause
because it is non-punitive in both intent and effect when it provides purely factual
infonnation to the public in order to prevent sex offender recidivism.
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TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES;
Petitioners, the States of Connecticut and Alaska, respectfully submit this brief and
request that this Court REVERSE the judgment of the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Ninth Circuits on the due process and ex post facto claims, respectively.
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is reported at
271 F.3d 38 (2001). The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
reported at 259 F.3d 979 (2001).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Elder v. Holloway. 510 U.S. 510, 516
(1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Before this Court are two companion cases arising from challenges made to Connecticut
and Alaska Stale laws (“the statute”), on appeal from the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Second and Ninth Circuits, respectively. State laws of the type challenged here exist in every
state and are sometimes called “Megan’s Laws ” after a New Jersey law named for Megan
Kanka. (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 81.) Seven-year-old Megan did not know her neighbor was a
convicted sex olTender when he sexually assaulted and murdered her in 1994. (J.A. 81.) Now,
every state requires law enforcement to collect identifying information on sex offenders. (J.A.
81.) Federal law withholds certain federal funds from states that do not establish these laws and
release such information from them as is necessary to protect the public. (J.A. 26.)
The laws challenged here are codified at General Statutes of Connecticut sections 54-250
to 54-261, and Alaska Statutes sections 12.63.010 to 12.63.100 and 18.65.087. (J.A. 26, 138.)
Respondents are John Doe I of Connecticut and John Doe II of Alaska, bringing suit on
behalf of themselves, two classes of Connecticut sex offenders, another Alaska sex offender, and
John Doe II’s wife (“the sex offenders”). (J.A. 84, 134.) The sex offenders brought these
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actions under 42 United States Code section 1983 alleging, among other things, that the statutes
violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clauses and the Ex Post Facto
Clause of Article 1, section 10 of the United States Constitution. (J.A. 3, 110.)
Petitioners are stale agencies and officials from the two States. They appeal decisions in
the Second and Ninth Circuits that hold each State’s statute unconstitutional. (J.A. 97, 222.)
Preliminary Statement
1.

Connecticut’s Procedural History.

On behalf of plaintiffs below, John Doe I filed an amended complaint against
Connecticut State officials (“Connecticuf’) in the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut on November 14, 2000. (J.A. 1.) Both sides moved for summary judgment. (J.A.
65.)
The court ruled on May 18, 2001 in favor of Connecticut on the ex post facto claim and
in favor of the sex offenders on the due process claim. (J.A. 51, 72.) The court then
permanently enjoined Connecticut from enforcing the Connecticut sex offender registry statute
and prohibited the public disclosure of information on convicted sex offenders. (J.A. 60.)
On the same day, Connecticut appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and moved for a stay of the injunction. (J.A. 73, 101.) The sex offenders also
appealed. (J.A. 75.) After denying the motion for stay and expediting the appeal, the Second
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court on October 19, 2001. (J.A. 97, 102.)
2.

Alaska’s Procedural History.

In Alaska, on May 13, 1994, convicted sex offender John Doe II filed his amended
complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska against officials of the
State of Alaska (“Alaska”). (J.A. 110, 111, 143.)
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The court preliminarily enjoined the State from releasing the sex offenders’ registration
information to the public on July 27, 1994. (J.A. 143, 197.) Both sides moved for summary
Judgment. (J.A. 202, 203.) On March 31, 1999, the court found in favor of Alaska on the ex
post facto claim and all other claims but granted the sex offenders leave to renew their federal
due process claims based on alleged violations of state-created rights to privacy and
rehabilitation. (J.A. 185,188.) The sex offenders renewed the claims and both sides moved
again for summary judgment. (J.A. 188.) The court again found for Alaska on all claims on
August 12, 1999. (J.A. 191.) Tlie sex offenders appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
(J.A. 194.)
The Ninth Circuit reversed on April 9, 2001. (J.A. 209, 227.) The court ruled for the sex
offenders on the ex post facto claim and did not reach the due process claim. (J.A. 222.)
Both Connecticut and Alaska filed a petition for certiorari, which this Court granted to
Connecticut on May 20, 2002, and to Alaska on February 19, 2002. (J.A. 108, 229.) The Court
consolidated the two cases for briefmg. (J.A. 230.)
Statement of Facts
In 1994, seven-year-old Megan Kanka was sexually assaulted and murdered by her
neighbor. (J.A. 81.) Megan was not his first victim. (J.A. 81.) Before taking Megan’s life and
innocence, the perpetrator had previously been convicted of two sex offenses. (J.A. 81.) In her
memory and in the interest of public safety, her native State of New Jersey passed ‘ Megan s
Law” to provide for public dissemination of information about convicted sex offenders. (J.A.
81.) The legislatures of every state have since passed their own version of New Jersey s
“Megan’s Law.” (J.A. 81.)
Congress also enacted legislation reflecting the growing concern over sex offenders.
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(J.A. 81.) Under federal law, states that do not have sex offender registries lose a portion of
federal funds. (J.A. 81-82.) To remain eligible for the hinds, states must register certain
convicted criminals, provide the information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local law
enforcement agencies, and release the information to the extent necessary to protect the public.
(J.A. 26.) Connecticut and Alaska charge their Departments of Public Safety (“DPS”) with the
duty to provide sex offender information to the public. (J.A. 7, 141.)
1.

Connecticut’s Sex Offender Registry Statute.

In 1998 and 1999, when the Connecticut Legislature revised the statute to conform with
the federal law, it stated that its legislative purpose was to “make it possible for the public to
protect itself’ and not to impose “additional punishment for [sex offenders].” (J.A. 26, 43.)
Committing a sexually violent offense, a felony committed for a sexual purpose, a criminal
offense against a victim who is a minor, or a nonviolent sexual offense subjects a Connecticut
resident to the provisions of the statute. (J.A. 81.) The information DPS collects from the sex
offenders includes name, fingerprints, photograph, identifying physical features, conviction
information and residential address. (J.A. 82.) Not all of this information is made available to
the public. (J.A. 82.) No criminal scienter is required to trigger application of the statute, and it
applies equally to the offenses of those not guilty by reason of mental disease or who plead nolo
contendere. (J.A. 47.)
To serve the statute’s purpose of keeping the public informed about persons convicted of
sexual offenses, Connecticut’s DPS verifies the requisite information at least once every year,
sending address verification forms to the sex offenders. (J.A. 82.) Guided by this theme of
ensuring public safety, Connecticut’s statute provides certain exemptions for individuals who
would otherwise fall within its scope. (J.A. 84.) If a court finds that “registration is not required
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for public safety,” the statute exempts persons under nineteen years of age convicted of engaging
in sexual intercourse with someone between thirteen and sixteen years old. (J.A. 84.) Similarly,
the statute allows a court to exempt persons convicted of subjecting another person to sexual
contact without the victim’s consent. (J.A. 84.) The statute protects victims of crime by
allowing a court to exempt an offender where it detennines disclosure is not required for public
safety but threatens to reveal the victim’s identity. (J.A. 84.) Offenders convicted of sexual
assault in a spousal or cohabitating relationship may be exempted, as well as offenders whose
crime involved a victim less than 18 years of age and to whom the offender is related. (J.A. 84.)
The Connecticut Legislature demonstrated its sensitivity to all states shared concern for
public safety by providing additional registration requirements for offenders who move to a new
Slate. (J.A. 82.) An offender who moves must notify the new state of his or her new address,
and DPS must make the system accessible to law enforcement and coordinate agencies. (J.A. 82,
83.) Additionally, a registrant with strong ties to another state must comply with that state s
registration requirements. (J.A. 82.)
Connecticut’s statute requires DPS to provide the public with information about
convicted sex offenders in an easy-to-access Intemet format. (J.A. 83.) DPS satisfied this
requirement with a website that first became available to the public on Januaiy 1, 1999. (J.A.
83.) The Connecticut Legislature also demonstrated its concern for the safety of registrants
themselves by requiring DPS to expressly warn on its Intemet site of criminal prosecution
against anyone who uses the information to “injure, harass or commit a criminal act against any
person included in the registry.” (J.A. 83.)
The first page of the Connecticut website states that its purpose is “not to warn about any
specific individual,” but “to make the public information more easily available and accessible.
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(J.A. 83.) Additionally, it states that persons listed in the registry are included “solely by virtue
of their conviction record and state law,” and that DPS “has made no determination that any
individual included in the registry is currently dangerous.” (J.A. 83.) In spite of Connecticut
DPS’ compliance with the State’s mandate to provide this information and expressly warn
against abuse of the infonnation, the district court issued a permanent injunction against it on du^
process grounds, blocking public access to the website on May 18, 2001. (J.A. 83.)
2. Alaska's Sex Offender Registry Statute.
Alaska enacted legislation similar to Connecticut’s statute the same year Megan Kanka
was murdered by the twice-convicted sex offender. (J.A. 212.) Learning that its State had the
highest rate of child sexual abuse in the country, that a quarter of its prison inmates were
convicted of sex offenses, and that the recidivism rate for sex offenders was extremely high,
Alaska Legislators established a system to provide the public with information about convicted
sex offenders. (J.A. 141-142.)
The Alaska Legislature found that “protecting the public from sex offenders is a primary
governmental interest.” (J.A. 140.) Sex offenders include individuals convicted of incest, sexual
assault, possession of child pornography, forcing a minor to engage in prostitution, sexual abuse
of a minor, kidnapping a child, and indecent exposure. (J.A, 213.) Strict liability offenses
covered by the statute include sexual abuse of a minor under thirteen years of age, where the age
of the victim may be unknown to the defendant. (J.A. 217.)
Individuals convicted of the relevant crimes must register in person at the nearest state
trooper post or police department. (J.A. 141.) Their identifying information is then provided to
the public upon request in paper form and on the Internet. (J.A. 142.) DPS takes measures to
protect the anonymity of parties requesting information through the registry. Alaska Stat.
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18.65.087(d)(1)(C) (LEXIS L. Publg. 2001). Offenders who move to another state must notify

that state of their plan to move, and DPS must notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation there of
the intended address. Alaska Stat. § 12.63.030(a) (LEXIS L. Publg. 2001).
The information collected by DPS includes sex offenders names, fingerprints,
photograph, identifying physical features, conviction information, residential and employer s
address, date of birth, and driver’s license number. (J.A. 213.) Not all of the collected
infonnation is disclosed to the public. Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087(b).
Most offenses require registration annually for fifteen years. (J.A. 213.) Persons
convicted of an aggravated sex offense, more than one sex offense, or child kidnapping must
register in person at the local police station at least four times per year for life. (J.A. 213.)
The sex offenders from both Connecticut and Alaska challenge their respective statutes
on ex post facto grounds, alleging the registry is punitive and cannot be applied retroactively.
(J.A. 20, 113.) Connecticut sex offenders claim they have been “publicly branded as a result of
the alleged punitive nature of the statute. (J.A. 18.) Alaska sex offenders fear the label of
“sexual offender tends to motivate portions of society” to acts of violence and will result in
ostracism and condemnation. (J.A. 112.) Alaska sex offenders make vague reference in their
complaint to instances of such “rising up” in another state, but the record includes only one
example of an Alaskan sex offender who experienced any such public ostracism. (J.A. 112,
216.) Connecticut sex offenders fail to allege any specific examples of injury or ill treatment.
(J.A. 17.) Connecticut sex offenders also claim the statute deprives them of their due process
richts in that it denies them an opportunity to be heard, despite DPS’ silence on whether any
particular registrant poses a current threat to society. (J.A. 19, 84.)

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Connecticut’s sex offender registry statute does not deprive the sex offenders of their due
process rights since the statute does not satisfy either prong of the stigma-plus test. Because
Connecticut’s registry does not make any affirmative statements about the sex offenders that are
capable of being proven false, the statute does not stigmatize the sex offenders. Unlike registries
that attempt to predict what level of threat a registrant poses, Connecticut’s registry merely
provides tlie public with factual infomiation, avoiding any need for a due process hearing. To
the extent the sex offenders feel stigmatized by the registry or are concerned about any
implication of dangerousness, their convictions for egregious sex crimes are the sole culprit, not
the State of Connecticut or its registry.
Additionally, the statute does not impose any tangible or material loss or alteration of a
legal right sufficient to satisfy the plus prong. The sex offenders do not allege the statute has
imposed any specific loss, nor does the statute circumscribe their freedom of movement,
employment, or personal relations. The statute merely establishes regulatory requirements in the
interest of public safety. Connecticut’s sex offender registry statute, therefore, does not violate
the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution.
The Alaska sex offender registry statute does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause
because it is not punitive in nature. Every court that has considered the issue has concluded that
the Alaska Legislature intended the statute to serve a solely regulatory, non-punitive purpose.
This intent is illustrated by the statute’s unambiguous language expressing concern for the public
safety and a need for increased information in the wake of a devastating increase in sex crimes.
Only the clearest proof of punitive effects can override the statute’s manifest nonpunitive intent. Applied to the case at bar, the seven factors used to evaluate a statute’s effects
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do not satisfy this heavy burden. First, the statutes impose no disability or restraint because the
sex offenders are free to do as they wish within the law, and the ostracism they fear is conjectural
and not caused by the statute. Second, the statute does not resemble any historical punishments,
including those which in times past forced criminals into physical humiliation at the hands of a
coordinated and v indictive public. Third, the statute does not consider scienter. Fourth, any
deterrent effect of the statute is typical of non-punitive legislation. Fifth, criminal behavior often
triggers non-punitive legislation. Sixth, the statute furthers the non-punitive purpose of
protecting vulnerable members of the public from sex crimes by providing them with factual
information. Seventh, the statute is not excessive because it merely provides the information to
tlic public in a reasonable and non-invasive form. In the absence of punitive effects, the sex
offenders’ experience of personal shame is insufficient to constitute state-authorized punishment.
Constitutional avoidance requires more to strike down a statute.
Connecticut’s and Alaska’s statutes are thus constitutional because they do not violate the
Due Process or Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution.
ARGUMENT
I.

CONNECTICUT’S SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY STATUTE AVOIDS DUE
PROCESS CONCERNS BECAUSE IT PASSES THE STIGMA-PLUS TEST WHEN IT
PROVIDES THE PUBLIC WITH PURELY FACTUAL INFORMATION.
A plaintiff who brings a governmental defamation action under 42 United States Code

section 1983 alleging a violation of the Due Process Clauses must satisfy the stigma-plus test to
invoke a liberty interest protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. Paul v. Davis. 424 U.S. 693, 710-12 (1976). The stigma prong requires the
plaintiff to establish the following elements: (1) the government uttered a statement, (2) that is
sufficiently derogatory to injure plaintiffs reputation, (3) that is capable of being proven false.

10

and (4) that plaintiff claims is false. Doe v. Conn.. 271 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 2001). The plus
prong of the test requires that in addition to the stigma, plaintiff suffer either a burden or loss or
the governmental activity alter some legal right or status that plaintiff previously held. Paul, 424
U.S. at 701-02, 710-12. Because the government did not make an express statement in the
registry about the sex offenders and the statute does not result in a plus factor, the sex offenders
have not invoked a liberty interest protected under the Due Process Clauses.
A.

The Registry Does Not Impose a Stigma on the Sex Offenders Because it Does
Not Make an Express Statement That is Capable of Being Proven False.

The first and second elements of the stigma prong require the plaintiff to establish that
the government uttered a statement sufficiently derogatory to harm the plaintiffs reputation.
Doe V. Conn.. 271 F.3d at 47. The original cases applying the stigma-plus test and those leading
to its establishment did not involve sex offender registry cases. Paul, 424 U.S. at 696; Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); Bd. of Repents v. Roth. 408 U.S. 564, 408 (1972); Wis^
Constantineau. 400 U.S. 433, 435 (1971). These cases, involving allegations of criminal
behavior or professional misconduct, required that the government make an express statement
about the plaintiff to satisfy the stigma prong. Paul. 424 U.S. at 696; Goss. 419 U.S. at 574;
Roth. 408 U.S. at 408; Constantineau. 400 U.S. at 435. The cases did not suggest that an
implication like that the sex offenders allege in the case at bar could satisfy the stigma prong.
1.

The registry does not make the requisite express statement to satisfy_die
stigma prong.

Whether allegations concern criminal behavior or professional misconduct, the Supreme
Court and the Circuit Courts of Appeals have always required an affirmative derogatory
statement about the plaintiff, not merely an implication, to satisfy the first and second elements
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of the stigma prong. Paul. 424 U.S. at 696; Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 435; E.B. v. Vcmiero,
119F.3d 1077, 1083 (3d Cir. 1997).
a.

Only express statements predicting criminal propensities constitute
a stigma.

Affiimative statements made by the government which attempt to predict an individual’s
cun'cnt or future criminal propensities satisfy the first and second elements of the stigma prong.
Paul. 424 U.S. at 696; Constantineau. 400 U.S. at 435; Vemiero. 119 F.3d at 1083; W.P. v.
Poritz, 931 F. Supp. 1199, 1219 (D.N.J. 19961: Doe v. Atty. Gem. N.E.2d 1007, 1012(1997). In
Paul, police officers distributed flyers to local merchants containing the names and photographs
of convicted shoplifters, referring to them as “active shoplifters.”' Paul, 424 U.S. at 695.
Although the Court denied respondent’s due process claim on other grounds, it held that the
government’s express statement labeling persons as “active shoplifters” amounted to a stigma,
id at 698-700. This Court also held that flyers distributed by local law enforcement to liquor
store owners alleging that certain persons become dangerous after excessive drinking stigmatized
those listed on the flyer. Constantineau. 400 U.S. at 435.
Unlike the Connecticut registry, the flyers in Paul and Constantineau did not merely
provide the public with factual information that certain persons were convicted of an offense.
Rather, the Paul flyers claimed that the listed person currently engaged in shoplifting activities.
Paul. 424 U.S. at 695. The Constantineau flyers asserted that the named individuals posed a
future threat of becoming dangerous if they consumed excessive amounts of alcohol. 400 U.S. at
435. In contrast, Connecticut’s registry only provides the public with factual information about
the sex offenders’ convictions. (J.A. 83.)

' At the time the police officers distributed the flyers, plaintiffs shoplifting charge was pending
and later dismissed. Paul. 424 U.S. at 696.
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Similarly, an individualized assessment about what degree of risk the government
believes a convicted sex offender currently poses or may pose in the future introduces a stigma.
Verniero. 119 F.3d at 1083; Doe v. Pataki. 3 F. Supp. 2d 468, 468 (S.D. N.Y. 1998); Poritz. 931
F. Supp. at 1219; Attv. Gen., N.E.2d at 1012. Most of the statutes in the individualized
assessment cases involve a tiered system where the government tried to assess whether a
particular offender poses a low, moderate, or high threat of re-offense. Vcmiero, 119 F.3d at
1083; Pataki. 3 F. Supp. 2d at 468; Poritz. 931 F. Supp. at 1219; Attv. Gen., N.E.2d at 1012.
Conversely, sex offender registries similar to Connecticut’s merely provide factual
information about a registrant. (J.A. 83.) Connecticut’s registry overcomes due process
challenges because it does not make individualized assessments about future dangerousness and
is not analogous to those that do. See Vinswanath Akella v. Mich. Dept, of St. Police. 67 F.
Supp. 2d 716, 730 (E.D. Mich. 1999); Lanni v. Engler. 994 F. Supp. 849, 885 (E.D. Mich. 1999);
Doe V. Kelly. 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997): contra Doe v^Williams, 167 F. Supp.
2d 45, 51 (D.D.C. 2001) (holding that a registry without a risk assessment stigmatized plaintiff)^.
b.

Only express statements about professional misconduct constitute
a stigma.

Just as courts have found a stigma in cases involving affirmative statements that predict
criminal propensities, they have also found a stigma in the employment context when the
governmental employer makes express statements about employee misconduct. Donato v. Old
Bethpaee C. Sch. Dist.. 96 F.3d 623, 630-31 (2d Cir. 1971); Brandt v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Serv..
820 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1984); Huntley v. Community Sch. Bd.. 543 F.2d 979, 985 (2d Cir.

^'Williams relied on a flawed analysis, supporting its holding with a line of cases that involved
registries making individualized assessments, unlike its own registry, which was similar to
Connecticut’s. 167 F. Supp. at 51-56. The only registry case Williams relied on that provided
factual information instead of risk assessments is the case at bar. Id at 63. Accordingly,
Williams is of no persuasive value.
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1976). Due process governmental defamation suits in the employment context have only been
successful when the employer attacks specific aspects of an employee’s work performance,
“denigrat[ing] the employee’s competence as a professional and impugn[ing] the employee’s
professional reputation.” Donato. 96 F.3d at 630-31: see also Brandt. 820 F.2d at 45; Huntley,
543 F.2dat985.
The Second Circuit focused on the specificity of the employer’s statements in Donato,
Brandt, and Huntley. Even general statements of “professional misconduct,” for example, are
“vague statements of unspecified incompetence” and do not constitute a stigma for due process
claims against the government. O’Neill v. City of Auburn, 23 F.3d 685, 692-93 (2dCir. 1994).
The requisite of specificity in addition to an express statement in the governmental employment
context indicates further that the kind of abstract implication alleged by the sex offenders does
not constitute a stigma.
Similarly, an express unsubstantiated claim that a teacher engaged in sexual misconduct
with his autistic students is the type of statement sufficient to satisfy the stigma prong. Brandt,
820 F.2d at 45. This Court also held that an unconfirmed statement that a police officer
attempted suicide stigmatized the officer.^ Codd v. Veleer, 428 U.S. 624, 628 (1977) (police
officer’s employer reviewed his personnel file from a previous employer which contained an
allegation that the officer attempted suicide).'^ Conversely, Connecticut’s registry provides only

^ The affirmative statement alleging a suicide attempt is still subject to the third element of the
stigma prong, which requires that the statement be capable of being proven false. Paul, 424 U.S.
at 701-02. The affirmative statement that a convicted sex offender has been convicted cannot
satisfy this element or the stigma prong because it cannot be proven false.
^ In Codd. the plaintiffs new employer assumed he had been terminated from his previous job
because of the suicide attempt. 429 U.S. at 625. The Court accepted the possibility that a stigma
could arise if an employer “creates and disseminates a false and defamatory impression about the
employee.” Id. But the Court first required the express statement of a suicide attempt to satisfy
the stigma prong, not the implication the employer drew about the cause of termination. Id
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factual infomiation about the sex offenders and does not make any unsubstantiated direct
allegations such as those central to the stigma found in Brandt and Codd.
Whether the statement the government utters involves unsubstantiated explicit allegations
of criminality or specific attacks on an employee’s professional competence, the statement must
be express to satisfy the first and second elements of the stigma prong. Those elements,
requiring the government to make a statement that is sufficiently derogatory to harm a plaintiffs
reputation, Doe v. Conn.. 271 F.3d at 47, are not satisfied by a vague and attenuated implication.
The sex offenders’ claimed stigma of an implication of current dangerousness thus deviates
sharply from the express statements this Court and lower courts require for a stigma finding.
2.

Tlie sex offenders cannot establish the third element of the stigma prong
because they cannot prove an implication false.

The third element of the stigma prong requires that the statement is capable of being
proven false. Paul. 424 U.S. at 701-02. This element lends overwhelming support to the
proposition that the govenunent must make an express statement to satisfy the stigma prong. Id.
The logic to an express statement requirement in governmental defamation cases alleging a due
process violation is simple: without such a statement, there is nothing the plaintiff can prove
false, and no need for a due process hearing to challenge the veracity of a statement made by the
government arises. Vinswanath. 67 F. Supp. 2d at 730; Lanni 994 F. Supp. at 885; Kelly. 961 F.
Supp. at 1112. This is precisely the case with Connecticut’s registry, which merely provides
factual information about a previous offense and does not predict whether a registrant poses or
may pose a risk. (J.A. 83.)
In fact, the registry does exactly the opposite. (J.A. 83.) The registry stated on the first
page of the website that the government “made no determination that any individual included in
the registry is currently dangerous.” (J.A. 83.) The statute recognizes both the inherent
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difficulty of assessing which, if any, of the sex offenders pose a current threat and the need to
protect them from being branded currently dangerous. (J.A. 83-84.) They do this by informing
N'iewers that registrants are “included solely by virtue of their conviction record and state law.
The main purpose of this data ... is to make the information more easily available and
accessible, not to warn about any specific individual.” (J.A. 83-84.)
The registry provides in a more convenient forum factual information that is already
available to the public. Vinswanath. 67 F. Supp. 2d at 730; Lanni, 994 F. Supp. at 885; Kelly,
961 F. Supp. at 1112. Perhaps the photographs and identifying feature information, for example,
would not be available to the public but for the registry. (J.A. 82.) However, the sex offenders’
self-imposed stigma is attached to the conviction, not to the picture or other information. See
Dean v. MeWherter. 70 F.3d 43, 45 (6th Cir. 1995).
Even if the stigma prong did include implications, the sex offenders have not established
that the public would adopt their claimed implication. Doe v. Conn., 271 F.3d at 49. The
Second Circuit stated that it cannot assume the public would necessarily form the opinion that
registrants are currently dangerous.

The court agreed with the State’s doubt about whether,

as a matter of law, dissemination to the public implies to any particular reader that everyone is
dangerous, or even that an “appreciable fraction” of the public would so conclude.

at 49.

Additionally, any negative public perception of the sex offenders stems not from the existence of
the registry or notification procedures but from the choices they made leading to their conviction.
See Dean. 70 F.3d at 45. Because the registry contains no statement that the sex offenders can
prove false and any negative implication arises from the sex offenders’ own actions, they fail the
first prong of the stigma-plus test.
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B.

The Connecticut Statute Does Not Tnvolve a Plus Factor Because the Sex
Offenders Have Not Suffered a Material Loss or Burden. Nor Does the Statute
Alter Their Legal Status or Rights.

The government must cause the plaintifF to suffer some tangible or material loss or
alteration of a legal status to satisfy the second prong of the stigma-plus lest. Paul. 424 U.S. at
710-12. This loss or alteration of a legal status is distinct from the defamatory statement. Id
Connecticut’s sex offender registry statute does not result in any plus factor comparable to those
found in governmental defamation suits. Paul 424 U.S. at 710-12; Goss. 419 U.S. at 574; Roth.
408 U.S. at 573; Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach. 250 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001),
rehearing denied. 273 F.3d 395 (2001).
1.

The sex offenders have not suffered any tangible or material loss.

Only a plaintiff who suffers a material or tangible loss as a result of the stigma satisfies
the plus prong. Paul. 424 U.S. at 710-12. In the governmental employment context, this Court
and other circuit courts found a plus factor or its equivalent when the stigma results in the
plaintiff losing his or her job, or it “forecloses the freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities” in plaintiffs specific professional field. Roth. 408 U.S. at 573; see
also Cannon. 250 F.3d at 1302; Baden v. Koch. 799 F.2d 825, 829 (2d Cir. 1986); Donato. 96
F.3d at 630; Huntley. 543 F.3d at 985. This Court rejected a plus finding where plaintiff merely
alleged the stigma could potentially limit his job opportunities or that it makes a plaintiff less
attractive to prospective employers. Siepart v. Gillev. 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991). Courts have
also rejected a plus finding where an employer refused to retain an employee, Roth. 408 U.S. at
573, demoted an employee, Baden. 799 F.2d at 830, or denied an employee a promotion.
Cannon. 250 F.3d at 1302. Loss of employment or employment opportunities, therefore, must be
specific and within the employee’s chosen professional field to satisfy the plus prong. Id
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Similarly, the Sixth Circuit refused to recognize a plus factor in a sex offender registry
case based on sex offenders’ claim of decreased attractiveness to employers. Cutshall v.
Sundquist. 193 F.3d 466, 483 (6th Cir. 1999). The sex offenders have not claimed that they lost
their jobs or that the statute forecloses opportunities within their chosen professional field.
Rather, they merely assert “decreased employment opportunities” as one basis for the plus prong.
(J.A. 18.) Decreased employment opportunities are not a basis for the stigma prong. Sjegart,
500 U.S. at 233: Cutshall 193 F.3d at 483.
In addition to loss of employment opportunities in a given professional field, loss of a
legal right may constitute a plus factor. Goss. 419 U.S. at 574; Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 435;
Doc V. Pr/or. 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999). This Court held that loss of a legal
right to public education constitutes a plus factor. Goss. 419 U.S. at 574. Similarly, the loss of
the right to purchase alcohol is sufficient to invoke a liberty interest. Constantineau. 400 U.S. at
435. One sex offender registry case likewise found the plus prong satisfied by a statute that
prohibited registrants from changing their names and limited where they could work or live.
Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 1231. Connecticut’s statute does not impose any restrictions or loss of
legal rights on the sex offenders sufficient for a plus finding. They may choose where and with
whom they live and work. (J.A. 83-84.) Moreover, even if such opportunities were limited for
the sex offenders, the limitations stem from the nature of their convictions, not the registry,
because conviction information is already a matter of public record. Dean, 70 F.3d at 45,
Vinswanath. 67 F. Supp. 2d at 730; Lanni. 994 F. Supp. at 885; Kelly. 961 F. Supp. at 1112.
Consequently, the sex offenders in the case at bar have not suffered any loss comparable to those
recognized as plus factors by any court.
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2.

A statute that does not assess registrants’ risk levels avoids imposing a
plus factor on the sex offenders.

The stigma-plus test did not develop in the context of sex ofTender registry cases. Paul.
424 U.S. at 696; Goss, 419 U.S. at 574; Roth. 408 U.S. at 568; Constantineau. 400 U.S. at 435.
These non-registr>' cases required the plaintifT to suffer the loss of some right to satisfy a plustype of factor. With the expanded application of the stigma-plus test to sex ofTender registry
laws, courts have used different terms to describe the plus factor. Vemiero, 119 F.3d at 1083;
Pataki. 3 F. Supp. 2d at 471: Poritz. 931 F. Supp. at 1219. In this new context courts use various
terms to describe the plus factor, including alteration of legal status, alteration or extinguishment
of legal rights, material burden, and tangible loss. Verniero. 119 F.3d at 1083; Pataki. 3 F. Supp.
2d at 471; Poritz. 931 F. Supp. at 1219. The difference in terminology makes applying the plus
prong more difficult in the sex offender registry context.
As the Second Circuit pointed out in Doe v. Connecticut, the language for each plus
standard and the rationale supporting them is ambiguous in sex offender registry cases. 271 F.3d
at 42. However, courts generally only find the plus prong satisfied in such cases when the
registry involves an individualized assessment of dangerousness.^ Verniero. 119 F.3d at 1083;
Pataki. 3 F. Supp. at 471: Poritz. 931 F. Supp. at 1219. Whether holding that the statute’s
registration requirements are overly burdensome or the penalty for failure to comply with the
requirements alter the registrants’ legal status, the courts find as they do because the state
assigned a risk level to sex offenders and then deprived them their constitutional right to
challenge this assessment. Verniero. 119 F.3d at 1083; Pataki. 3 F. Supp. 2d at 471; Poritz. 931
^ As previously discussed, the Williams court was one registry case finding the stigma-plus test
satisfied even though the registry at issue did not make individualized risk assessments. 167 F.
Supp. 2d at 51. Because the Williams court relied on cases involving risk assessment registries
unlike its own, Williams’ plus finding does not support the sex offenders’ argument. Id. at 5156.
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F. Supp. at 1219. Sex offenders challenging the constitutionality of registries that only provide
the public with factual infonnation, on the other hand, have not successfully established a plus
factor or any equivalent. Cutshall. 193 F. 3d at 482; Lanni, 994 F.Supp. at 85 6; Kdly, 961 F.
Supp. at 1112. The case at bar only presents factual information and does not meet the standard
for the plus prong as applied to sex offender registry cases.
3.

Tlie statute is not overlv burdensome because it merely places regulatory
requirements on the sex offenders.

E\ cn if risk assessments were not the most relevant factor to various courts’ findings of
the plus prong in sex offender registry cases, the registration requirements are not overly
burdensome and do not alter registrants’ legal status. Governments routinely create legal
Statuses and may attach to them regulatory requirements. Failure to comply with many
reuulatory requirements may result in fines and even criminal sanctions. The sex offenders
registration requirements attach to their self-inflicted legal status of convicted sex offender.
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-250-261 (2001). Many other legal statuses have comparable registration
requirements. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-38, 12-700, 12-735-738 (2001).
For example, Connecticut’s motor vehicle operators are subject to various State
requirements. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-38. They must provide the State with proof of their
identity, demonstrate their driving skills, and sign an application under oath. Id. Some
Connecticut drivers are even required to provide the State with specific medical documentation.
Id, Failure to comply with the State’s driver’s license statute subjects Connecticut drivers to
monetary sanction and possible imprisonment. 14 Similarly, Connecticut requires all incomeearning residents to pay taxes every year, maintain records and documents to support income tax
claims, and provide such additional information as the State requests. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§12700, 737. Failure to comply with the State’s income tax statute subjects income-earning
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residents to monetary sanctions and possible criminal incarceration. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 12-735^
738. Just like the State’s driver license and income tax statutes, the sex offender registry statute
places incidental regulatory requirements on the sex offenders as a result of their legal status.
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-250-261.
The statute even attempts to reduce the burden on the sex offenders by requiring, for
example, DPS to send address verification forms directly to them. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-257,
Also, the sex offenders are only required to submit to DPS’ request for a photograph once every
five years, amounting to only two times for most of the registrants who are subject to the statute
for a ten-year period. Id The sex offenders, therefore, cannot claim that their self-imposed legal
status of convicted sex offender and the registration requirements that attach satisfy the plus
prong of the Paul test. The sex offenders have not presented any loss, burden, alteration of legal
status or rights sufficient to satisfy the plus prong.
C.

The Public Needs Access to Information About Convicted Sex Offenders Due to
Their High Recidivism Rates, and Connecticut’s Registry Avoids Due Process
Concerns bv Only Disseminating Factual Information.

Following the brutal rape and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka by her twice
convicted sex offender neighbor, the federal government and every state expressed a growing
concern over the high rates of recidivism among sex offenders by enacting a version of sex
offender registry and notification laws. (J.A. 26, 81-82.) This Court, too, recognizes that
convicted sex offenders are much more likely to commit subsequent offenses than any other type
of offender. McKune v. Lile. _ U.S.

122 S. Ct 2017, 2024 (2002) (citing Department of

Justice statistics). Given such high recidivism rates, states need to implement protections for the
public safety. Doe v. Conn.. 271 F.3d at 42. At the same time, all citizens, sex offenders
included, are protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses from
deprivation of a liberty interest without an opportunity to be heard. U.S. Const, amend. V; U.S.
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Const, amend. XIV, § 1. Connecticut’s statute, authorizing dissemination of only factual
infonnalion about the sex offenders, provides the public with necessary information while
protecting the sex offenders’ constitutionally protected liberty interests. Vemiero, 119 F.3d at
1077; Pataki. 3 F. Supp. 2d at 468: Poritz. 931 F. Supp. at 1219; Atty. Gen,, N.E.2d at 136.
Connecticut’s registry does not invoke the need for an opportunity to be heard, unlike
registries that make individualized risk assessments. Vemiero. 119 F.3d at 1077; Pataki, 3 F.
Supp. 2d at 468; Poritz. 931 F. Supp. at 1219; Atty. GetL, N.E.2d at 136. Sex offenders’
challenges to registration and notification laws complain that the government has not given them
an opportunity to be heard on whether or not they pose a threat to society or what level of threat
they pose. Vemiero. 119 F.3d at 1077; Pataki. 3 F. Supp. 2d at 468; Poritz, 931 F. Supp. at
1219; Attv. Gen.. N.E.2d at 136. Registries making such assessments - labeling sex offenders in
a certain way - provide a basis for challenge. Vemiero, 119 F.3dat 1077; Patald, 3 F. Supp. 2d
at 468; Poritz. 931 F. Supp. at 1219; Attv. Gen., N.E.2d at 136. Sex offender registry and
notification statutes that do not impugn a specific risk level on sex offenders, on the other hand,
avoid constitutional issues by providing only truthful, public information, where those who
receive the information may look at the facts and make their own determinations about
registrants. ^ Cutshall. 193 F. 3d at 482; Dean, 70 F.3d at 45; VinswanaLh, 67 F. Supp. 2d at
730; Lanni. 994 F. Supp. at 855; Kelly. 961 F. Supp. at 1112.
Connecticut’s statute does not just avoid due process concerns, it also mandates
safeguards against abuse of registry information. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-258. Even though the
sex offenders’ convictions are already a matter of public record, the statute seeks to protect the
sex offenders by requiring DPS to include an express warning in the registry than anyone who
uses the information to “injure, harass or commit a criminal act against any person included in
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the registry” is subject to criminal prosecution. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-258. Similarly, the statute
authorizes a court to order DPS to restrict dissemination of information about certain sex
ofTcnders to law enforcement only if the court finds that dissemination is not necessary for public
safety. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-255.
In addition to avoiding constitutional concerns, fact-only registries such as Connecticut’s
avoid serious accuracy problems underlying risk assessments. WTien the government attempts to
predict sex offenders’ future behavior, issues over accuracy arise. R. Karl Hanson, The Science
of Sex Offenders: Risk Assessment. Treatment, and Prevention: \Vha\ Do We Know About Sex
Offender Risk Assessment. 4 Psychol., Pub., Policy, & Law 50, 52, 76 (1990). Clinical studies
have shown that such risk assessments have serious flaws. Id As a result, requiring a state to
make a risk assessment raises serious constitutional and regulatory concerns. Id. at 56. On the
other hand, statutes like Connecticut’s that do not make uncertain predictions avoid such
problems while still providing the public with necessary and valuable information.
Connecticut’s sex offender registry statute is consistent with the Due Process Clauses of
the United States Constitution. It does not satisfy the stigma-plus test required to invoke a
protected liberty interest in defamation suits against the government. In fact, the statute avoids
due process concerns because it provides the public with factual information about previous
convictions and does not attempt to predict whether the sex offenders are likely to repeat past
behavior.
II.

ALASKA’S SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY S.TATUTE COMPLIES WITH THE EX
POST FACTO CLAUSE BECAUSE IT IS NOT PUNITIVE IN INTENT OR EFFECT.
The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits legislatures from retroactively creating a new crime,

making an existing crime greater, increasing an existing crime’s punishment, or altering the rules
of evidence. U.S. Const, art. I, § 10; Carmell v. Texas. 529 U.S. 513, 522 (2000); Calder v.
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Bull 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798). A statute must be both retroactive and punitive for it to violate the
Ex Post Facto Clause. Calder. 3 U.S. at 391. A two-part inquiry determines whether a statute is
punitive. Kan, v. Hendricks. 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997); U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249
(1980). The first inquiry requires courts to determine whether the legislature intended the statute
to be civil or punitive. Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 361. If the legislature’s intent was civil, the
second inquiry requires the party challenging the statute to establish by “clearest proof that the
purpose or the effect is so punitive that it negates the legislature’s civil intent. Id Courts will
not reject the legislature’s manifest intent when the party fails to meet this heavy burden. Id
This Court uses seven factors to determine whether a statute is punitive in effect.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963).^ The factors when applied to the
case at bar illustrate that the effect of the statute is not sufficiently punitive to overcome Alaska’s
legislative intent. The factors include: (1) "whether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment"; (3)
"whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter"; (4) "whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment — retribution and deterrence"; (5) ’whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) "whether an alternative purpose to which it
may rationally be connected is assignable for it"; and (7) "whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned." Id
A.

Alaska’s Legislative Findings Demonstrate the Stanite’sNon-Punitive Intent.

Principles of statutory construction guide the initial determination of whether a law is
civil or criminal. Hudson v. U.S.. 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997). Courts need look no further than the

” The factors were delivered in dicta. Kennedy. 372 U.S. at 170. The Court in Kennedy
acknowledged it need not apply them because it conclusively found the congressional purpose
for the statute under review (which forfeited the citizenship of men who moved to another
country for the purpose of dodging the draft) was punitive. Id
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plain language of the statute when it is unambiguous and consistent with the statutory scheme.
Robinson v. Shell Oil. 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). A legislature’s explicit findings indicate its
intent. Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional Ctr.. 253 F.3d 870, 871 (5th Cir. 2001), Russell v.
Gregoire. 124 F.3d 1079, 1087 (9th Cir. 1997).
Tlie Alaska Legislature plainly stated in its findings that sex offenders have a high rate of
recidi\'ism and protecting the public is a primary governmental interest. 1994 Alaska Sec. L. ch.
41. It also stated that releasing infonnation about convicted sex offenders to public agencies and
the general public would assist in protecting the public safety. Id This theme is underscored by
the corresponding federal law, which requires states to release sex offender registry information
“necessary to protect the public.” 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (2002). Part of the statute is codified
in Alaska’s Code of Criminal Procedure, but this placement does not indicate pumtive intent.
Otte. 259 F.3d at 986; Patterson v. Alaska. 985 P.2d 1007, 1012 (Alaska App. 1999); CutshaU,
193 F.3d at 474 (noting that, while Tennessee’s sex offender registration statute is placed in the
criminal code, “noticeably absent” is an indication of non-regulatory intent).
The sex offenders have in fact already conceded that at least one purpose of Alaska in
passing the statute was the protection of the public. (J.A. 167.) The Ninth Circuit, the federal
district court, and a state court, after reviewing the issue, all concluded that the Alaska
Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute was non-punitive. Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979, 986 (9th
Cir. 2001); Patterson. 985 P.2d at 1012-1013; (J.A. 154, 163). The statute thus is non-punitive
under the first prong of the intent-effects test.
A.

The Statute’s Effects Are Not Punitive.

In applying the Kennedy factors to analyze a statute’s effects, “no one factor should be
considered controlling.” Hudson. 522 U.S. at lOI. This Court specifically condemned focusing
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on the “excessiveness” factor where it saw a temptation to do so in the context of sex offender
registry statutes. Hudson. 522 U.S. at 98 n. 4. The application of the factors to each case hinges
on its own “highly particularized context.” Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960).
Further, a statute can be non-punitive even when some factors point the other way.

6.g.

Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 363 (finding the indefinite detention of sex offenders who are
dangerously mentally ill non-punitive although it involves an affirmative restraint), U.S. v.
Ursciy, 518 U.S. 267, 290-292 (1996) (finding a forfeiture statute non-punitive although it is
triggered by a crime and is a deterrent).
1.

The statute imposes no affirmative disability or restraint.

The first Kennedy factor asks whether the statute imposes an affirmative disability or
restraint. Kennedy. 372 U.S. at 168. This Court has looked to whether a statute’s effect
approaches the “infamous punishment” of imprisonment in evaluating whether it imposes an
affinnative disability or restraint. Hudson. 522 U.S. at 104. Routine registration does not
approach this type of burden. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1089, 1092 (citing the decisions often
different courts upholding registration provisions in its finding that Washington s sex offender
registry statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause). The quarterly or annual registration
requirement does not impose much more of a restraint than securing an Alaska driver s license.
(J.A. 156.) As such, the registration provisions here do not provide an affirmative disability or
restraint.
The notification provisions similarly do not create an affirmative disability or restraint.
Providing registration information to the public on the Internet does not limit a sex offender s
ability to choose where he lives, travels, or seeks employment. Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d
1244, 1250 (10th Cir. 2000). In fact, dissemination of information found in the public record in
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and of itself “has never been regarded as punisliment when done in furtherance of a legitimate
governmental interest.” Vemiero. 119 F.3d at 1100.
Courts have upheld notification procedures significantly more burdensome on sex
offenders than Alaska’s. For example, the Tliird Circuit found New Jersey’s Megan’s law nonpunitive even though it permits local authorities to canvass neighborhoods and actually alert
those members of the public whom certain sex offenders are "likely to encounter.” Vemiero.
119 F.3d at 1083. New Jersey authorities provided a packet of information on one sex offender
to eighty-two educational institutions, day care centers and summer camps within a half mile of
the offender’s home, and all residents within a block of his house. Id at 1088. The package of
infonnation included the offender’s name, photograph, physical description, residence,
workplace, conviction, and even vehicle description. Id at 1084. Despite such active
notification and even though the plaintiff experienced violent acts and lost employment and
housing as a result, the court found that no direct restriction was placed on sex offenders. Id at
1102: but see Kan, v. Meyers. 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996) (finding an affirmative disability
or restraint for a plaintiff sex offender who had already experienced ostracism and an eviction
when the statute provided for unrestricted public access to registry information).
In contrast, members of the public must seek out sex offender information in Alaska on
the Internet or through law enforcement, and sex offenders here do not allege they have
experienced violent acts or lost employment or housing. (J.A. 112, 142.) Any consequences of
the notification provisions are thus even less restrictive on the sex offenders than are
neighborhood canvassing provisions like those upheld by the Third Circuit. See Femedepr, 227
F.3d at 1250.
Even if the sex offenders did experience disabling effects, they are not consequences of
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the statute. Doe v. Pataki. 120 F.3d at 1280. A statute does not establish an affirmative
disability or restraint w hen the feared negative consequences are merely speculative and the
infonnation is already in the public domain. Ill, v. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d 433,439 (Ill. 2000),
rchcarinu denied. (Ill. Nov. 27, 2000) (upholding Illinois’ sex offender registry statute against
constitutional attack on several grounds, including an ex post facto challenge). Criminal
convictions are already a matter of public record. (J.A. 172, 174); Doe v. Patald, 120 F.3d at
1280. Employment and housing applications routinely request this information. Susan Deschler
Oakes, Student Author, Megan’s Law: Analysis on WOtether it is ConstiUitional to Notify the
Public of Sex Offenders Via the Internet. 17 John Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 1133, 1153

(1999). Loss of employment or housing opportunities for convicted sex offenders thus predate
sex offender registry statutes and are not directly attributable to them. Id.
Beyond these common consequences of criminal behavior, a state that decides to provide
infonnation to its population is not responsible for the illegal acts of those who would misuse it.
j^i^issell. 124 F.3d at 1092. Indeed, courts may assume states will enforce their laws that prohibit
such behavior. 14 Further, it is private third parties who perpetrate incidents of ostracism, not
the state. One v- Pataki 120 F.3d at 1280. The criminal acts of the sex offenders prompt
ostracism, not any act of Alaska. Id
Alaska’s website explicitly states at the bottom of its opening page and on every
individual record that “This information is made avaUable for the purpose of protecting the
public. Anyone who uses this information to commit a criminal act against another person is
subject to criminal prosecution.” Alaska DPS, Alaska Department of Public Safety Sex Offender
Registration Central Registry <http://www.dps.state.ak.us/nSorcr/asp/> (accessed Oct. 21, 2002).

The Alaska sex offenders have not even suggested they are statistically apt to experience such
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abuse (J A. 112.) More than a thousand Alaska sex offenders are currently subject to the
notification provisions of the statute, and the record identifies only one who has experienced any
kind of hardship.'' (J.A. 216.) Thus, the feared hardship is only speculative and cannot be
gi'ounds for establishing an onerous affirmative disability or restraint. Malchow, 739 N.E.2d at
439 Even if the sex offenders here could establish a likelihood of hardship, the causal
connection of such hardship to the statute is tenuous at best. Accordingly, application of this
Kennedy factor affirms the civil nature of the statute.
2.

The statute does not fit within traditional indicia of punitive treatment.

The second through fifth Kennedy factors consider traditional indicia of punishment by
determining whether a statute imposes an historical punishment, requires scienter, satisfies
traditional aims of punishment, or is triggered by a criminal act. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168.
The second Kennedy factor invites courts to examine historical methods of punishment.
Id. at 168. Registration provisions such as those covered under the statute are regulatory, not
punitive, measures. Russell 124 F.3d at 1089. Alaska’s driver’s license registration is simUar in
effect. (J.A. 156.) Sex offenders in Alaska are not subject to the rigors that accompany parole
release or probation supervision, such as behavioral restrictions and searches at an officer’s
request. Patterson. 985 P.2d at 1012. Nor are the notification provisions comparable to
historical shaming rituals like branding, stoning, or pillorying. (J.A. 164.) Those who
authorized such rituals intended the inevitable ostracism and humiliation. Russell, 124 F.3d at
1091-1092; Doe v. Pataki. 120 F.3d at 1283-1284; Cutshall, 193 F.3dat475; (J.A. 164). The
ostracism typically required the physical participation of the offender. Russell, 124 F.3d at 1091.
In contrast, the Alaska Legislature here did not intend to humiliate the sex offenders, and

^ As of October 9,2002, the listing of available records online was fifteen pages, of
approximately 100 offenders per page. Alaska DPS <http://www.dps.state.ak.us/nSorcr/asp/>
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certainly did not authorize such humiliation. (J.A. 164.); supra pt. 11(A) (discussing the intent of
the Legislature). As with “wanted posters” or police flyers identifying shoplifters, the sex
offenders may experience humiliation when their heinous acts become public knowledge, but
that docs not forbid the public from knowing about them. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 696; Russelj,
124 F.3d at 1092. Rather than seeking to shame the sex offenders, the statute seeks to protect the
public by informing it. Infra pt. 11(B)(3) (discussing the civil purpose of the statute). Because no
meaningful analogy can be made here to historical forms of punishment, this factor also weighs
in Alaska’s favor.
In evaluating the third Kennedy factor, which considers the role of scienter, courts are to
look to the face of a statute, not to its underlying triggering event. Hudson, 522 U.S. at 104;
Fcmcdccr. 227 F.3d at 1251. Here, the statute applies to a “sex offender or child kidnapper who
is physically present in the state.” Alaska Stat. § 12.63.010(a). Scienter is irrelevant to a
determination of physical presence, and thus irrelevant to the face of the statute. Even if the
Court were to look beyond the face of the statute, those who, like the sex offenders here, plead
“nolo contendere” or “no contest” by definition do not admit guilt. Black’s Law Dictionary,
1069 (Bryan A. Garnered., 7th ed., West 1999). Scienter thus cannot be established in the case
at bar, and this factor weighs in Alaska’s favor.
Many civil statutes promote the traditional aims of punishment or apply only to behavior
that is already a crime, so the fourth and fifth Kennedy factors are not dispositive indicia of
punishment. See e.g. Hudson. 522 U.S. at 105 (imposition of sanctions based on criminal
conduct does not render the sanctions punitive, and deterrence serves civil as well as criminal
goals); Urserv, 518 U.S. at 292 (civil forfeiture statute is non-punitive although it deters and only
applies after a criminal conviction). Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S, 442,453 (1996) (forfeiture of
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a vehicle is non-punitive even when conviction for an illegal act inside the vehicle prompts it);
Allen V. Ill.. 478 U.S. 364, 370 (1986) (the application of a civil proceeding only to persons
charged with a crime does not make it a criminal proceeding). Thus, even if the statute deterred
sex offenders,* and although it stems from a prior conviction, these factors do not meaningfully
weigh in favor of finding the statute punitive.
Because civil statutes can serve traditional aims of punisliment and attach after a crinunal
conviction, and because the statute before the Court does not consider the scienter of the sex
offender or resemble historical forms of punisliment, application of these four Kennedy factors
all affirm the civil nature of the statute.
3.

The pumose of the statute is to protect the public, and its implementation
is not excessive in relation to this purpose.

The sixth and seventh Kennedy factors examine whether a statute is excessive in relation
to any non-punitive purpose. Kennedy. 372 U.S. at 168-169. A state’s protection of its citizens
is a legitimate non-punitive interest. Hawker v. N.Y.. 170 U.S. 189, 200 (1898); Patterson, 985
P.2d at 1011. A state possesses police power that can be implemented on behalf of the
community to protect it from the dangerous tendencies of a few. Allen, 478 U.S. at 373 (holding
that an Illinois proceeding did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on forced self
incrimination when it required a man to submit to psychiatric evaluation to determine whether he
was a sexually dangerous person and thus subject to civil commitment).
More specifically, the Court upheld last term a Kansas law that required sex offenders in
prison to make self-incriminating statements about their offenses and past sexual behavior during
treatment in order to prevent re-offenses. McKune. 122 S. Ct. at 2032. The danger to the public

* If the prospect of a long jail term failed to deter a sex offender, a registry statute probably will
not, either. Malchow. 193 Ill. 2d at 423.
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created by the high rate of sex offender recidivism creates a legitimate non-punitive state interest
in rehabilitation sufficient to warrant forcing sex offenders to make self-incriminating statements
during treatment. McKune. 122 S. Ct. at 2024. The Alaska Legislature was similarly motivated
w hen it sought to protect the public from sex offender recidivism through the statute. See supra
pt. 11(A) (discussing intent of the Legislature), The sex offenders here already conceded that the
protection of the public was a purpose of the statute. (J.A. 167.) Thus, Alaska’s interest in
protecting the public from the recidivism of sex offenders is a legitimate non-punitive purpose,
and the sixth Kennedy factor weighs decisively in Alaska’s favor.
a.

The information on convicted sex offenders that Alaska provides
to the public via the Internet reasonably serves the purpose of
public safety.

This Court has recognized a First Amendment right to receive information and ideas and
lias refrained from regulating the content of non-obscene speech on the Internet. Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 863 (1997); Va. St. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 757 (1976). In Reno, the Court recognized the compelling interest in protecting young
people physically and psychologically but refused to abridge Internet speech to do so. Id. at 869.
Consequently, the Court struck down a statute with insufficient First Amendment safeguards that
was meant to protect minors from obscene or offensive material on the Internet. Id^ at 885. This
Court recently confirmed the First Amendment prohibition on government restrictions on
Internet speech with non-obscene subject matter or content. Ashcroft v. ACLU, —U.S. —, 122
S. Ct. 1700, 1707 (2002) (upholding a narrowly tailored statute protecting minors from obscene
material on the Internet). The Court by upholding Alaska’s Internet notification provisions does
not have to choose between protecting minors and protecting free speech. Instead, the Court can
help protect minors by protecting free speech.
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In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the notification
provisions of the statute were excessive because of the possibility of ostracism and overbreadth.
One. 259 F.3d at 991-993. Ostracism here is speculative, and even if it were to occur, its cause
likely would not be attributable to the statute. Cal. Dent, of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S.
499, 509 (1995); Doe v. Pataki. 120 F.3d at 1279: see supra pt. 11(B)(1) (discussing the absence
of a disability or restraint). The court below based its overbreadth concern on the presentation of
the registration information on the Internet and on Alaska’s choice against narrowly tailoring the
statute to the risk of individual recidivism. Qtte. 259 F.3d at 991-993.
Tlie government speech at issue here is reasonable in light of the compelling
governmental interest at stake: protecting the public from sex crimes. Femedeer. 227 F.3d at
1253 (upholding Utah’s sex offender registry statute, which like Alaska’s published sex offender
registry information on the Internet). The Third Circuit in upholding the original Megan’s Law
against ex post facto challenge observed that dissemination of accurate public record information
“has never been regarded as punishment when done in furtherance of a legitimate governmental
interest.” Vemiero. 119 F.3d at 1099. Conviction information is already a matter of public
record. (J.A. 172, 174.) In fact, even prior to conviction, individuals’ identifying information
has long been publicly disseminated by law enforcement via “wanted” posters. Russell, 124
F.3d at 1092. Similarly, police can distribute lists of individuals arrested for shoplifting. Paul.
424 U.S. at 713. Unlike those whose photos are associated with criminal behavior on shoplifter
lists or wanted posters, the sex offenders here have opportunity under Alaska law to correct any
inaccuracies in the information promulgated about them. Alaska Stat. § 18.65.087(d)(lXA). If a
state can publicly identify people arrested but not tried, the state should be able to publicly
identify people tried and convicted of sex crimes.
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Similarly, the statute is not excessive because making the registry information available
online is not invasive. The “Internet is not as invasive as television or radio because affirmative
steps must be taken to receive information.” Reno. 521 U.S. at 870. Yet, information on
con\ ictions is often disseminated over the television via news reports. Oakes, 17 John Marshall
J. Computer & Info. L. at 1159. The Ninth Circuit criticized Alaska’s choice to put the
information on the Internet because it “does not in any way limit its dissemination to those to
whom the particular offender may be of concern,” Otte, 259 F.3d at 992, but neither does
information promulgated by television or radio. States should have no less of a right to provide
truthful, accurate information to the public than do private parties, such as news media. Stephen
R. McAllister, “Neighbors Beware”: the Constitutionality of State Sex Offender Registration and
Community Notification Laws. 29 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 97, 129 (1998).
Further, if an offender is not of concern to someone, that person has no reason to actively
search for the offender on the Internet. See Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253. Unlike states which
rely on a subjective “likely to encounter” determination by police and then canvass entire
neighborhoods with photographs and detailed information on sex offenders, Alaska lets its
residents determine for themselves whether they need to check into somebody s past behavior.
Alaska Admin. Code tit 13, § 09.050 (2002); cf Vemiero, 119 F.3d at 1085. In this way.
members of the public are able to help prevent their own victimization on an as-needed basis.
Oakes, 17 Jolin Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. at 1159.
This Court has also used a “reasonableness” inquiry in determining when a state actor’s
public safety precautions invade constitutional privacy protections. Mich, v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1049-1051 (1983) (permitting police to search a person and his car during a traffic stop
when they reasonably believe he poses a danger); see also Patterson, 985 P.2d at 1017 (holding
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that Alaska sex offenders’ expectation of privacy must yield to society’s public safety interest).
For instance, schools can demand random, involuntary, supervised urine samples from high
school athletes in order to discourage drug use, even when neither probable cause nor suspicion
of individual drug use exists. Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665-666 (1995).
No individualized assessment is made before performing this invasive procedure because
students are randomly selected. Id at 650. Additionally, police can search both a person’s body
and car for weapons during a traffic stop, even without probable cause, when in the totality of the
circumstances they believe there is the potential for danger to the safety of the officers or the
public. Long: 46:^ U S. at 1051: Pa. v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-109(1977). In both
examples, the procedure is physically invasive to the person who is subject to state authority.
If in the absence of suspicion schools can demand urine samples of young people to
prevent drug use, and in the absence of probable cause police can demand searches of motorists
to prevent potential safety threats, then in the presence of past sex crime convictions the state
should be able to provide the public with factual information to prevent the devastating effects of
sexual victimization. The “harm” sex offenders cannot establish but claim to suffer is reasonable
in relation to the hann that befalls victims of sexual violence when the state does not protect its
citizenry.
b. Alaska’s choice not to make a controversial risk assessment is a
reasonable exercise of its discretion under principles of federalism.
The “essence of federalism” is that states should not be forced into uniformity, but be free
to find diverse solutions to the problems they face. Allen, 478 U.S. at 375. “The legislature is
not required to act with perfect precision, and its decision to cast a net wider than what might be
absolutely necessary does not transform an otherwise regulatory measure into a punitive
sanction.” Doe v. Pataki. 120 F.3d at 1283. To the extent the sex offenders claim the statute is
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o\'crbroad because it does not advocate an individualized assessments of each offender’s risk of
recidivism, they argue that the Alaska Legislature is not entitled to discretion in crafting its own
policies.
Further, while it is true that some states require individual risk assessments of offenders
before actively notifying the public of their release, see e.g. Vemiero, 119 F.3d at 1083; Doe v.
Pataki, 120F.3dat 1268: Attv. Gen.. N.E.2d at 1012, these risk assessments present their own
challenges given the inherent controversies in predicting future behavnor based on past misdeeds.
For instance, this Court noted in its opinion in Kan, v. Hendricks the testimony of one forensic
psychiatrist, “who stated that it was not possible to predict with any degree of accuracy the future
dangerousness of a sex offender.” 521 U.S. at 356, n. 2.^ One commentator who supports risk
assessments had to admit that across ten studies of over fourteen hundred sex offenders, clinical
judgment was less useful in predicting recidivism than the simple fact of prior sexual offense.
Hanson, 4 Psychol., Pub., Policy, & Law at 54. Similarly, a popular non-clinical method of
predicting recidivism is only negligibly better than the simple fact of prior sexual offense. Id. at
63.
Alaska’s discretion under our federalist system permits it to fmd its own resolution to the
difficult and controversial problem of sex offender recidivism. See Allen, 478 U.S. at 375.
Thus, while some states have relied heavily on individualized risk assessment, Alaska can hardly
be blamed for taking a different course. Accordingly, the excessiveness factor weighs in
Alaska’s favor.
In sum, the Kennedy factors applied to the case at bar support the Alaska Legislature’s

The danger posed by the sexual predator in the Hendrieja case was uniquely clear in that he
himself stated he would continue to molest children if released. Hendricks at 355; Hanson, 4
Psychol., Pub. Policy, & L. at 52
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civil intent. They do not present the necessary “clearest proof’ of punitive effect. Hendricks,
521 U.S. at 361. The district court and the Alaska Court of Appeals were correct when they held
that the statute was not punitive because the Kennedy factors as applied to the statute support the
civil intent expressed by its Legislature. Pattersmi, 985 P.2d at 1013; (J.A. 168.).
Q

Constitutional Avoidance Requires More Than the Sex Offenders Sense
of Shame to Strike Down the Statute.

The long-standing presumption of constitutionality forbids a court to lightly choose that
reading of the statute’s setting which will invalidate it over that wliich will save it.

Flemming

363 U.S. at 617. Burdens imposed on those convicted of crimes always appear to them to be
punisliment. Doe v. Pataki. 120 F.3d at 1284. But a statute should be evaluated on its face, not
as actually imposed, to determine whether it provides for a criminal sanction. Hudson, 522 U.S.
at 101.
Accordingly, this Court has found non-punitive a number of laws that are onerous in their
effect on an individual, including deportation, monetary sanctions, a prohibition on the practice
of one’s profession, and the elimination of an elderly individual’s only means of financial
support. Hudson. 522 U.S. 93 at 104 (imposing monetary sanctions); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032, 1038-1039 (1984) (deportation); Flemming, 363 U.S. at 621 (termination of
Social Security benefits); De Veau v. Braisted. 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (forbidding work as a
union officer); Hawker. 170 U.S. at 189 (forbidding the practice of medicine). Similarly, the Ex
Post Facto Clause does not address changes to civil statutes that merely alter the situation of a
party to his disadvantage. Collins v. Youngblood. 497 U.S. 37, 50 (1990) (finding a Texas
statute that retroactively reformed an improper jury verdict and thus eliminated defendant’s right
to a new trial did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause).
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Here, the “sting of punishment” the sex offenders purport to feel comes not from
punishment, nor non-punitive but onerous effects, nor the denial of a substantive right or
protection, nor even an experience of vindictive acts at the hands of private parties, but, instead,
from an entirely intemal source: shame. See Lanni. 994 F. Supp. at 854. While shame is indeed
a weighty burden, it is not weighty enough to fit within the jurisprudence of punishment.
While the sex offenders’ criminal history provokes shame in themselves, it stirs
something different in the hearts of the public: fear. Will sex offenders again hurt others through
their sexual malfeasance? In the absence of a definitive answer to tliis question, the public wants
at least to know what risks it faces. Alaska’s choice to make the necessary information readily
available for those who believe they can benefit from it is a measure consistent with its
responsibility to protect its populace. (J.A. 140.)
The Court need not run afoul of this well-established state interest nor of the Ex Post
Facto Clause. The Court need only permit Alaska to govern its people in its civil capacity and
uphold the statute against the ex post facto challenge.
CONCLUSION
The physical and emotional scars left on victims and their families by the perpetrators of
sex crimes are an unacceptable consequence of a society unable to protect its members. No
Justification exists for enforcing obstacles that keep the parents and teachers of small children
from accessing information that helps them protect their young from such scarring. No
justification exists for impeding a young woman’s effort to make educated choices about whose
company she keeps. Those who would exploit the vulnerability of such potential victims crave a
cloak of secrecy and anonymity. Connecticut, Alaska, and every other state have attempted,
through their sex offender registry statutes, to render that cloak unavailable to those who have
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worn it in the past. Tlie safety of our citizenry deserves no less. Therefore, this Court should
uphold both the Connecticut and Alaska sex offender registry statutes, and REVERSE the
decisions of the Second and Ninth Circuits.

Respectfully submitted,

Brerma L. Silberstein
Counsel for Petitioners
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